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In January 2013, American journalist Paul Salopek started walking. He had roughly 21,000 miles to go, 
in a journey (still ongoing as of September 2017) that would take him from Ethiopia to the southern 
tip of the American continent, via Asia and North America. The itinerary is not arbitrary: Salopek is 
retracing the footsteps of generations of Homo sapiens as they spread from East Africa—where our 
earliest ancestors lived, more than 100,000 years ago—to the other continents, reaching Patagonia 
around 10,000 years ago. Salopek’s journey mirrors the route followed by groups of Homo sapiens as 
they slowly marched through our planet, changing it dramatically as they established increasingly 
populous and complex civilizations. Salopek calls it the “Out of Eden” walk, a title that adds a mythical 
dimension to a project informed by scientific models of human evolution. The walk is chronicled—by 
Salopek himself and his team—on a website sponsored by the National Geographic Society.2 It is 
explicitly framed as a story and told in chapters. It is also, as one might expect, presented in deeply 
affective language: this is one individual’s attempt to connect with the deep history of human 
evolution, providing today’s humanity, fragmented along national, cultural, and economic lines, with 
something of an origin story, a common idea of “the human” to cling to.  
Obviously, this is a politically loaded project, which articulates an ideologically charged vision 
of humanity, as Salopek demonstrates through his empathetic account of the communities he 
encounters across the Global South. The West, to which Salopek undoubtedly belongs, has often 
aspired to identify the essence of humanity—what it means to be human, what it is like to be human; 
typically, these claims have ended up reinforcing the centrality of one particular culture, one particular 
group. “Out of Eden” complicates these blanket theoretical statements by foregrounding the physical, 
embodied performance of humanity: readers remain aware that, behind the written words of the 
website and companion articles, Salopek is reenacting, and at the same time performing, the 
evolutionary history of humankind by moving his body. This is how Salopek himself thematizes the 
embodiment of walking: “Walking is falling forward. Each step we take is an arrested plunge, a collapse 
averted, a disaster braked. In this way, to walk becomes an act of faith. We perform it daily: a two-
beat miracle—an iambic teetering, a holding on and letting go. For the next seven years I will plummet 
across the world.”3 
Something as quotidian and uncomplicated as walking is defamiliarized into a controlled fall, 
a risky action that exposes the subject and evokes the perils of evolution: how the individual, 
embodied subject is vastly overpowered by evolutionary pressures. At the same time, the highly 
embodied “two-beat miracle” of walking is inscribed into the stylistic texture of Salopek’s language: it 
is an “iambic” rhythm, which the passage first announces and then proffers through the prosody of “a 
holding on and letting go.” The “Out of Eden” project thus appropriates the body as a site for 
negotiating the ideologically fraught boundary between our understanding of the human and the 
spaces and temporalities that shaped the history of our species.  
Salopek’s narrative speaks to contemporary claims about the “enmeshment” between the 
human subject and biological, climatological, or geological processes—including evolution itself.4 If we 
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take at face value what science tells us, there is little doubt that the human is an ideological 
construction based on metaphysical beliefs: our species falls on an evolutionary continuum with other 
species; human societies are shaped by material things and processes and contribute to shaping 
them—sometimes dramatically, as in anthropogenic climate change. Narratives like Salopek’s 
translate this abstract realization into an embodied, affective experience that is not only recorded by 
language but—and this is my main claim in this article—conveyed to readers through a mechanism of 
embodied simulation. Readers’ bodies resonate with the “two-beat miracle” of Salopek’s walk and 
thus serve as a bridge towards the “deep history” of our species—where deep history includes events, 
such as the migration of Homo sapiens, that far preceded recorded history and whose temporal scale 
is incommensurable with that of individual human life.5 I propose that the foregrounding of bodily 
experience—and the resonance it can trigger in readers—can help narrative overcome that sense of 
incommensurability, by offering a human-scale equivalent to processes that unfolded on a more-than-
human scale. In Salopek’s case, thousands of years and countless human generations are compressed 
into a single man’s seven-year walk. This compression is the mechanism underlying what Gilles 
Fauconnier and Mark Turner call “conceptual blending,” which typically works by conflating an 
abstract, nonlinear process (such as human migration) with an embodied and much more tangible 
scenario, such as a man moving through space.6 Recent developments in embodied cognition (and in 
the related field of cognitive approaches to narrative) provide me with empirically grounded concepts 
to describe the embodied resonance that narrative may elicit as it attempts to convey the deep time 
of evolution. Of course, we’ll have to keep in mind that this rendering of more-than-human time 
periods into an embodied scenario can involve a loss of important information, or a distortion of 
scientific models. Yet the point of this translation is not scientific accuracy per se, but affective and 
imaginative impact within a culturally specific project (such as Salopek’s humanitarian narrative).  
I will tackle these ideas in three steps. I will first explore the embodied underpinnings of 
language understanding, arguing that we make sense of language—and particularly of the creative 
language of narrative—by leveraging bodily schemata and processes. In order to exemplify and test 
out these claims, I will turn to another narrative that, like Salopek’s, attempts to flesh out humanity’s 
embedding in evolutionary history; unlike Salopek’s, this is a fictional narrative, William Golding’s late 
modernist novel The Inheritors (1955). This text focuses on one of the dead ends of evolution—a 
Neanderthal man—and is able to depict both the cognitive difference and the common ground 
between modern humans and Neanderthals through highly embodied language. Golding’s 
engagement with a group of Neanderthals brings to the fore the conceptual challenges involved in 
moving beyond divisions between “us” (modern humans) and “them” (Neanderthals); at the same 
time, The Inheritors suggests that embodied resonance with a nonhuman other may be key to 
reducing this divide. In the final, concluding section, I will return to the big picture issue of how 
narrative can deploy embodied strategies to project a sense of interweaving with the nonhuman 
world. 
 
Embodied Involvement and Thick Simulations 
In fields ranging from psycholinguistics to neuroscience, substantial evidence is emerging that 
language comprehension is not divorced from language users’ bodies. On the contrary, language and 
embodiment are tightly coupled. In a 2013 experiment, psychologist Raymond Gibbs asked two groups 
of blindfolded participants to walk towards an object after listening to a story.7 Both groups stood at 
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the same distance from the object, which they had seen before being blindfolded. Essentially, the 
participants had to guess how far the object was, by walking towards it. The stories the participants 
listened to were the same except for one crucial detail: one version of the story contained an 
embodied metaphor, “Your relationship was moving along in a good direction”—where the abstract 
state of the relation was described in terms of physical motion in space. The other version of the story 
contained a more general statement, without any overt reference to the body: “Your relationship was 
very important to you.” The study found that participants in the metaphorical condition tended to 
walk for a longer time, and ended up farther away from the start position, than those in the 
nonmetaphorical condition. Gibbs reads this result as confirmation for his embodied simulation theory 
of metaphor understanding: we understand embodied language by enacting, internally and mostly 
unconsciously, the verbally portrayed embodied action; in the case of Gibbs’s experiment, this 
simulation mechanism primed the participants towards bodily movement and subtly boosted their 
performance when it came to actual walking. 
This is just a simple example of how language understanding triggers embodied responses, 
which can have very overt effects on how people use their bodies. In other scenarios, the role of the 
body in language comprehension remains covert—unless scientists probe it by way of brain imaging 
or more indirect, behavioral methods (for instance, by measuring response times to linguistic stimuli). 
Friedemann Pulvermüller has reviewed neuroscientific studies linking language comprehension to the 
motor cortex, including so-called mirror neurons.8 We understand verbs denoting embodied actions 
by relying on some of the same neural structures that are implicated in performing real actions. 
Consider verbal phrases such as “holding on” and “letting go” in the Salopek passage discussed above: 
processing these expressions activates neural mechanisms involved in the physical gesture of holding 
onto an object or letting go of it. Behavioral research in psycholinguistics—for example, by Arthur 
Glenberg and Michael Kaschak, or Martin Fischer and Rolf Zwaan—confirms this intuition: after 
parsing a sentence suggesting forward motion (such as Salopek’s “Walking is falling forward”), readers 
will be quicker to push a lever forward than in the opposite direction.9 Put otherwise, when the 
verbally described and the physically performed gesture are incongruent, there is an interference 
effect that suggests that the linguistic processing and the execution of movement have a shared neural 
basis. 
Results along these lines strongly imply that language understanding involves bodily schemata 
in a much more consistent way than was previously thought. Benjamin Bergen articulates this 
embodied view of language in Louder than Words, where he builds on the concept of “embodied 
simulation”: the physical enactment of a verbally conveyed action, such as holding something in one’s 
hand or walking in a certain direction.10 For Bergen, embodied simulation is the central mechanism of 
language comprehension, even if different kinds of language may activate it to varying degrees: the 
comprehension of abstract language (such as we may find in an encyclopedia entry on “determinism” 
or “chemical valence”) is clearly less embodied than the processing of language evoking concrete 
states of affairs and situations.11 
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Because narrative is by definition about concrete situations (and more specifically about 
events affecting one or more characters), its baseline embodiment will be fairly high. Thus, in a seminal 
article Hannah Chapelle Wojciehowski and Vittorio Gallese develop an account of narrative 
comprehension centered on the idea of “liberated embodied simulation,” a term that suggests that 
the simulations that accompany narrative reading are not directed at the reader’s physical 
surroundings, but at a nonactual scenario.12 Liberated embodied simulations are cognitive processes 
that operate at the same unconscious level as what psycholinguists call “situation models” or 
“construals” (schematic representations of the situation being verbally referred to).13 Just like 
situation models, embodied simulations are not (or not necessarily) experienced at a conscious level. 
Yet, as Wojciehowski and Gallese’s analysis of Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway goes on to show, not all 
embodied simulations triggered by verbal narrative are identical. In fact, the claim advanced by 
researchers working on the embodied basis of language is that simulations are implicated in making 
sense of any concrete linguistic expression, regardless of discourse context or stylistic qualities. 
Through the creative use of language, literary narrative is particularly effective at giving rise to what I 
will call thick embodied simulations, where the word “thick” is—after Clifford Geertz—a function of 
the experiential richness and semantic complexity of a simulation.14 Another way to put the same 
point is that simulations tend to be unconscious, low-level responses that rarely lead to a conscious 
feeling in engaging with everyday language. By contrast, literary narrative has developed devices that 
can make readers fully conscious of those simulations—for instance, by conjuring up vivid mental 
images or infusing the simulations with emotional, interpretive, or ethical significance.15 This 
stratification of responses is what I mean by the “thickening” of embodied simulations. Salopek’s 
passage (quoted above) is quite effective at this, because of how it evokes—repeatedly—the arrested 
quality of the walking, which disrupts expectations and elicits affect. Readers are much more likely to 
experience embodied involvement in response to Salopek’s conceit than to an ordinary sentence such 
as “I walked to the grocery store,” even as embodied simulation will be implicated in both cases. 
It is important to keep in mind that these claims about the thickening of simulations are based 
on intuitions about reader-response, not on direct empirical evidence. Clearly, more research is 
needed to substantiate and specify my notion of thickening. But, conceptually speaking, distinguishing 
between different kinds of simulations seems inevitable; in a similar vein, linguist David Ritchie argues: 
[A] robust concept of simulation […] may range across several levels of detail, from 
a subtle muscle contraction the individual is scarcely aware of or a fleeting emotion 
that barely registers, to a detailed imaginative reconstruction of the experience of 
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being lost in a dark cave [in Ritchie’s example], all the way up to a reader’s 
empathetic imaginative reconstruction of a writer’s experience.16  
Thick simulations are defined both by their level of detail (as Ritchie suggests) and by the salience of 
the affective responses and ethical judgments that accompany them, which will obviously depend on 
both the features of a certain narrative and readers’ interests and predispositions. 
The link between textual features and thickness of simulations is, of course, easier to 
generalize about than readers’ individual responses. Narratives typically focus on a character (a 
narrator or protagonist) who is present on the verbally evoked scene; readers’ embodied simulations 
tend to center on that character and reflect his or her spatio-temporal perspective, as an early 
psycholinguistic study by David Bryant and colleagues shows.17 One way to thicken simulations is, 
therefore, to evoke characters’ embodied engagement with their surroundings, or to foreground their 
affective responses. Creative metaphorical language can also help flesh out simulations by capturing 
a character’s experience with more clarity and nuance than would be possible through conventional, 
nonmetaphorical language.18 The tropes that punctuate Salopek’s account of walking are what I call 
“phenomenological” metaphors and similes: they bring readers closer to the lived experience (or 
phenomenology) of a particular character—in this case, the storyteller’s.19 
Not all thickening strategies are character-directed, of course. We have seen that Salopek’s 
passage foregrounds (and thematizes) the iambic rhythm of “a holding on and letting go”; along similar 
lines, style may also involve readers’ bodies by creating a certain kind of stylistic patterning that they 
experience in sensory terms. Moreover, moving now to the macro-level of plot, the progression of 
narrative itself may take on quasi-rhythmic qualities. Cognitive linguist Michael Kimmel talks about 
the “affective contour” of narrative to refer to the way in which expectations about the outcome of a 
story line fall into a certain pattern, with embodied image schemata—such as “path” or “blockage”—
structuring our understanding of the narrative. Such schemata, along with the affective values that 
accompany them, further contribute to readers’ embodied involvement.20 When these strategies are 
successful, embodied simulations become thick and may result in full-fledged bodily feelings: for 
instance, a sense of “presence” or immersion in a narrative that almost feels like a slice of reality; or 
an empathetic bond with a character; or a feeling of absorption into a plot, of “moving along” with 
the narrative and its twists and turns. William Golding’s The Inheritors deploys several of these 
embodied devices, as we’ll see in the next section, through its experimental, and at times disorienting, 
writing style. In that respect, Golding’s novel goes further than many other, more conventional 
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narratives set in prehistory in its attempt to blend embodied responses and the deep time of human 
evolution. 
 
Resonating with Lok 
Golding’s novel focuses on the experiences of a Neanderthal man, Lok, as he and his group members 
come into contact with a new species of humans (Homo sapiens).21 Only the last chapter, with an 
abrupt perspective reversal, centers on one of our conspecifics, Tuami, and offers an external 
viewpoint on the Neanderthal mind that had served as our guide throughout the novel. 
Narratologically speaking, both minds are depicted through internal focalization, but to vastly 
different effects. Indeed, the interest of Golding’s portrayal of Neanderthal thought processes lies not 
in its scientific plausibility, but in how effectively he conveys a sense of profound difference between 
modern humans and their Neanderthal cousins. Golding’s Neanderthals think in pictures, which they 
can share with their group members wordlessly, almost telepathically. By endowing his Neanderthals 
with this more-than-human cognitive ability, Golding pushes back against previous cultural 
representations of Neanderthals as bloodthirsty, brutish creatures.22 Even more strikingly, Golding’s 
Neanderthals appear incapable of intentional violence. Yet they are also severely limited in their 
abstract reasoning: their minds are drawn to sensory details in a way that slows down—and in some 
cases seems to inhibit—inference and generalization. Golding’s Neanderthals thus oscillate between 
human, more-than-human, and animal features in a way that foregrounds the ideologically loaded 
question of their cognitive difference. The novel thus speaks to contemporary discussions on Homo 
sapiens exceptionalism, and by extension to fields such as disability and autism studies.23 The 
challenge for the reader of The Inheritors is learning to appreciate Lok’s cognitive difference without 
establishing a hierarchical power relation with him, which adds to the difficulty of Golding’s prose.  
Indeed, as readers engage with the Neanderthal-focalized chapters they are asked to infer 
what is going on in the storyworld by extrapolating from the rich sensory texture of Lok’s 
consciousness. In Ian Gregor and Mark Kinkead-Weekes’s words, we “share [Lok’s] limitations as we 
use his eyes. It is of course open to us to use our own reasoning powers on his experience.”24 At one 
level, then, readers have to make up for the limitations of Lok’s thinking through conceptual 
inferences; but at another level they are asked to draw on the resources of their own embodied minds 
to imagine themselves into Lok’s body. This embodied resonance is an involuntary process, which 
applies to all readers who read Golding’s prose with comprehension. For those who are willing to go 
one step further and reflect, as I do here, on the larger stakes of their embodied involvement, the gap 
between humans and Neanderthals becomes bridgeable. 
In part, this connection between readers and Lok is an effect of the internally focalized 
depiction of the character’s inner experience; for instance, Lok “flared his nostrils and immediately 
was rewarded with a whole mixture of smells, for the mist from the fall magnified any smell incredibly, 
as rain will deepen and distinguish the colours of a field of flowers. There were the smells of the people 
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Neurodiversity: Special Issue,” Disability Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2010). 
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too, individual but each engaged to the smell of the muddy path where they had been.”25 Clearly, Lok’s 
proficiency at picking out each of his group members’ smell exceeds the sensory abilities of modern 
humans. As the narrator puts it in a later passage, Lok “performed miracles of perception in the cavern 
of his nose. The scent was the smallest possible trace.”26 The “miracle” of Lok’s sense of smell is, of 
course, difficult to grasp for readers. Yet consider the comparison with a field of flowers whose colors 
are intensified by the rain: this simile builds on a sense of (chromatic and not olfactory) differentiation 
readers are closely familiar with; it is what I called in the previous section a “phenomenological simile,” 
helping readers imagine the variety of smells that Lok is able to identify. But because smell is, unlike 
vision, a proximal sensory modality—in that its range is relatively limited—the simile prompts us to 
construct a detailed embodied simulation centered on Lok’s body.  
A related strategy that also serves to thicken readers’ embodied simulations is synesthetic 
metaphor. For instance, when Lok hears a group of Homo sapiens speaking, he experiences sound in 
terms of visual pattern: “The sounds made a picture in his head of interlacing shapes, thin, and 
complex, voluble and silly, not like the long curve of a hawk’s cry, but tangled like line weed on the 
beach after a storm, muddled as water.”27 The metaphorical association emphasizes the 
incomprehensibility of the language of Homo sapiens, whose qualities strike Lok as novel and 
perplexing (“tangled” and “muddled”). At the same time, the synesthetic connection points to Lok’s 
capacity to appreciate the interrelatedness of sensory input, before concepts and language break it 
down into separate sensory streams. As Lawrence Marks puts it in an article on the physiological basis 
of synesthesia, “there are natural correspondences between experiences in different sensory 
modalities, and […] these seem to be nothing less than ‘hard wired.’”28 Synesthetic metaphor as a 
linguistic device contributes to the sense that the narrator is recording Lok’s experience at a raw, 
unmediated level; readers are thus asked to construct simulations that mirror the interconnectedness 
of sensory stimuli. 
In two intriguing passages, the narrator depicts Lok’s body as capable of sensory “thinking” 
that does not require full consciousness. Here the embodied thought process is conveyed not through 
explicit verbal language, but through a mere, and yet highly suggestive, question mark: “There came 
a noise from the foot of the fall, a noise that the thunder robbed of echo and resonance, the form of 
a noise. Lok’s ears twitched in the moonlight so that the frost that lay along their upper edges shivered. 
Lok’s ears spoke to Lok. ‘?’ But Lok was asleep.”29 In the original, the question mark stands out even 
more, being preceded and followed by a line break; it is a graphic device signaling an indeterminate 
noise, which may (or may not) suggest possible danger. But just as the embodied warning does not 
register in Lok’s consciousness, its exact meaning escapes readers—a highly effective way of 
strengthening the empathetic bond between readers and Lok, because it suggests that readers are 
locked into the character’s embodied awareness of his surroundings. 
Other passages foreground not just perception but bodily movement; we have to imagine 
them as a close-up evocation of Lok’s skillful interaction with the environment. Here is an example: 
“Half-lying, half-crawling, grinning all the time with fear [Lok] moved out over the river. He could see 
the wetness down there, mysterious and pierced everywhere by the dark and bending stems. There 
was no place that would support his whole weight. He had to spread it not only through all his limbs 
and body but be always in two places, moving, moving as the boughs gave.”30 Lok seems to be climbing 
through branches suspended over a body of water, and the quickness and agility of his movements is 
captured by the simplicity of the metaphorical expression “be always in two places,” with the 
                                                          
25 William Golding, The Inheritors (London: Faber and Faber, 1955), 15–16. 
26 40. 
27 94. For more on synesthesia and embodiment, see Cristina Cacciari, “Crossing the Senses in Metaphorical 
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Cambridge University Press, 2008), 425–43. 
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30 Golding, 97. 
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repetition “moving, moving” directly reflecting the embodied logic of Lok’s climbing. Golding’s prose 
is rich in such kinetic traces, which work like the efficient brushstrokes of an impressionist painting: 
they create a compelling picture of the protagonist’s embodied experience even as readers struggle 
to understand his motivations in more cognitive terms, or to recognize the objects around him. 
Readers are thus encouraged to take on a Neanderthal’s body through sensorimotor empathy 
based on rich embodied simulations. This empathy is an equivalent of the immediate mimicry 
experienced by Lok himself: “As the smell of cat would evoke in him a cat-stealth of avoidance and a 
cat-snarl; as the sight of Mal tottering up the slope had made the people parody him, so now the scent 
turned Lok into the thing that had gone before him.”31 Not only does Golding’s novel prompt readers 
to imagine themselves into a Neanderthal’s body, but it does so by exposing the Neanderthal in them: 
their tendency to resonate with embodied language, in the same way as the novel’s Neanderthal 
protagonist, Lok, resonates with the things and people surrounding him, almost blending into them 
and losing any sense of self-other differentiation.32  
This embodied identification with Lok takes on new meanings as soon as the narrative 
perspective shifts from the Neanderthal to a Homo sapiens character, Tuami. The cognitive complexity 
of modern humans is announced by the fact that, unlike most Neanderthal characters, whose names 
are short and monosyllabic (Ha, Nil, Fa, Lok), Tuami and the other humans in his group have 
polysyllabic names.33 Here the world is far more recognizable than it was in the previous chapters: 
Tuami’s concepts overlap with our own, bringing the character’s mental as well as physical world into 
immediate focus. Consider the following passage, for instance: “[Tuami] waggled the paddle in the 
water and the sheets tossed. The sail made a sleepy remark and then was attentively full again. 
Perhaps if they squared off the boat, stowed things properly——? Partly to assess the job and partly 
to turn his eyes outwards from his own mind, Tuami examined the hollow hull before him.”34 Nowhere 
in the Neanderthal-focalized sections do we find such a clear articulation of causation (the paddling 
causes the wind to fill the sail), or of psychological motivation (Tuami’s complex reasons for examining 
the hull). 
But clarity comes at the expense of embodied proximity: as we engage with Tuami’s 
calculating mind, we develop a sense of cognitive mediation that marks a sharp departure from the 
physical rawness of Lok’s experience. The psychological divide between Lok and Tuami has important 
ethical implications, as Golding scholars have emphasized.35 While Neanderthals are, for Golding, 
fundamentally incapable of violence, Tuami’s thought processes evince a predisposition towards 
conflict and deception. It is precisely this predisposition, the novel implies, that determines the 
evolutionary success of Homo sapiens and its eventual obliteration of the Neanderthals. The novel 
ends with Tuami peering into the horizon and perceiving a “line of darkness” that serves as a symbolic 
equivalent of the evolutionary future of Homo sapiens. Yet Golding’s novel does not rule out the 
possibility of bridging the gulf between the two species of Homo: the title already suggests that there 
might be continuity between them, that modern human may have “inherited” something from their 
evolutionary relatives.36 What is inherited is, on my reading, the capacity for somatic resonance—
                                                          
31 Golding, 67. 
32 In J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, the protagonist—Elizabeth Costello—comments as follows on Ted 
Hughes’s poems “The Jaguar” and “Second Glance at a Jaguar”: “In these poems we know the jaguar not from 
the way he seems but from the way he moves. The body is as the body moves, or as the currents of life move 
within it. The poems ask us to imagine our way into that way of moving, to inhabit that body”; J.M. Coetzee, The 
Lives of Animals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 51. My contention is that Golding does the same 
by asking readers to inhabit a Neanderthal’s body. 
33 I am indebted to Hannah Wojciehowski for this observation. 
34 Golding, The Inheritors, 215. 
35 See, e.g., Gregor and Kinkead-Weekes, William Golding: A Critical Study of the Novels, 60–62. 
36 This idea of “inheritance” resonates with current DNA evidence pointing to interbreeding between Homo 
sapiens and Neanderthals. Traces of this interbreeding can be detected in the genetic profile of living non-African 
humans. See Paul H. Mason and Roger V. Short, “Neanderthal-Human Hybrids,” Hypothesis 9, no. 1 (2011): e1. 
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which is demonstrated by Lok at the diegetic level, but also stimulated in readers by Golding’s deeply 
embodied style. The upshot is that the audience may span the evolutionary gap between themselves 
and Neanderthals by imaginatively embodying the latter—and the distinctiveness of their cognitive 
make-up. In turn, this embodied dynamic raises questions about Homo sapiens and the troubled 




Evolution has become an important focus for approaches to literature attempting to move beyond 
dichotomies between nature and culture, biology and social practices. Scholars such as Joseph Carroll 
or Jonathan Gottschall have argued that literary texts, including literary narratives, are shaped by 
evolutionary biases and predispositions.37 For instance, in a study of the British novel they hypothesize 
that “protagonists and their associates would form communities of cooperative endeavor and that 
antagonists would exemplify dominance behavior.”38 The problem with this approach is that the 
generality of the hypothesis inevitably evacuates or at least sidelines the specific complexity of 
individual texts. Largely in response to these reductionist models, Nancy Easterlin has developed a 
“biocultural” account of interpretation that steers clear of the universalist assumptions of hard-nosed 
evolutionary literary criticism; instead, it seeks to expose the “relationship between cognitive 
predispositions, historical situations, literary artifacts, and the aesthetic value of individual texts.”39 
This is, largely, the philosophy that informs this article, and it offers an important model for this special 
issue as a whole.  
Human evolution is, for writers like Golding or—in the domain of nonfiction—Salopek, 
something fundamentally problematic, and not just due to gaps or limitations in scientific knowledge. 
Rather, the spatio-temporal scale of evolutionary processes resists straightforward capture in 
narrative form, because of what Monika Fludernik describes as the “anthropomorphic bias” of 
storytelling: narrative is not just a human practice, but a practice geared towards the spatio-temporal 
parameters of human societies.40 Further, narrative accounts of human evolution are caught up with 
humanity’s uneasy efforts to define its position vis-à-vis the material world, including nonhuman 
animals and the Homo species that preceded us. In this article, I have argued that embodiment is a 
crucial resource for narrative as it tries to overcome these hurdles: Salopek’s narrative project 
foregrounds bodily movement as a stand-in for human migration over the eons of evolution, while 
Golding’s novel confronts us with the cognitive divide between Neanderthals and our ancestors in 
embodied terms. In both cases, the body puts readers in touch with the deep history of our species, 
potentially prompting them to revisit and reappraise humanity’s embedding in the material world. 
This invitation becomes particularly salient in Golding’s novel, in which somatic empathy for a 
Neanderthal destabilizes notions of Homo sapiens superiority and mastery, instead revealing our 
shared embodied (and biological) “inheritance,” which binds us to other living creatures and to the 
material environment in which we evolved.  
                                                          
Of course, Golding’s probing of our problematic Neanderthal inheritance is cast in ethical and imaginative terms, 
instead of strictly biological ones, but the convergence is remarkable. 
37 Joseph Carroll, “An Evolutionary Paradigm for Literary Study,” Style 42, no. 2 & 3 (2008): 103–35; Jonathan 
Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2012). 
38 Joseph Carroll et al., “Palaeolithic Politics in British Novels of the Nineteenth Century,” in Creating Consilience: 
Integrating the Sciences and the Humanities, ed. Edward Slingerland and Mark Collard (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), Kindle Locations 5997–98. 
39 Nancy Easterlin, A Biocultural Approach to Literary Theory and Interpretation (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 35. 
40 Monika Fludernik, Towards a “Natural” Narratology (London: Routledge, 1996), 13. On evolution’s resistance 
to narrativization, see also H. Porter Abbott, “Unnarratable Knowledge: The Difficulty of Understanding 
Evolution by Natural Selection,” in Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences, ed. David Herman (Stanford: 
CSLI Publications, 2003), 143–62. 
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Crucial to this destabilizing action is narrative’s capacity to engage readers through embodied 
strategies. Building on research in the mind sciences, I have argued that embodied simulation—the 
reenactment of verbally described actions—is an important component of narrative comprehension. 
However, while embodied simulations tend to be pervasive and unconscious in everyday language, 
literary narrative has the power to evoke simulations that are experientially textured and impactful. 
Various stylistic strategies, such as synesthetic metaphor or the foregrounding of bodily movement, 
can contribute to the thickening of embodied simulations. Certainly, more work—both empirical and 
conceptual—is needed to deepen our understanding of how literary language can resonate in readers’ 
bodies. But, as I have tried to show in this article, a biocultural account of literary narrative should 
develop a sensitivity to both cognitive-level involvement and to the broader interpretive and even 
ideological stakes of that involvement: in Salopek’s and Golding’s writings, thick embodied simulations 
become bound up with a renegotiation of the evolutionary history of our species. Problematic notions 
of Homo sapiens exceptionalism are questioned, and with them culturally entrenched conceptions of 
what constitutes a “normal” human embodied mind. This narrative probing of our biocultural identity 
through the deep history of evolution is exemplified by Salopek and Golding, but it is not—of course—
limited to them.41 In fact, it falls into a broader tendency in contemporary narrative to unsettle the 
divide, entrenched in Western culture, between humanity and the material world, human and 
nonhuman animals. Thus, this article should be seen as part of a wave of narratological approaches 
that seek to move narrative theory beyond its anthropocentric comfort zone.42 
 
Bibliography 
Abbott, H. Porter. “Unnarratable Knowledge: The Difficulty of Understanding Evolution by Natural 
Selection.” In Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences, edited by David Herman, 143–62. 
Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2003. 
Bergen, Benjamin K. Louder Than Words: The New Science of How the Mind Makes Meaning. New 
York: Basic Books, 2012. 
Bryant, David J., Barbara Tversky, and Nancy Franklin. “Internal and External Spatial Frameworks for 
Representing Described Scenes.” Journal of Memory and Language 31, no. 1 (1992): 74–98. 
Cacciari, Cristina. “Crossing the Senses in Metaphorical Language.” In The Cambridge Handbook of 
Metaphor and Thought, edited by Raymond W. Gibbs, 425–43. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. 
Caracciolo, Marco. “Bones in Outer Space: Narrative and the Cosmos in 2001: A Space Odyssey and Its 
Remediations.” Image & Narrative 16, no. 3 (2015): 73–89. 
———. “Embodiment at the Crossroads: Some Open Questions Between Literary Interpretation and 
Cognitive Science.” Poetics Today 34, no. 1–2 (2013): 233–53. 
———. “Literary Proto-Humans: Cognition and Evolution in London’s Before Adam and Golding’s The 
Inheritors.” Orbis Litterarum 71, no. 3 (2016): 215–39. 
———. “Phenomenological Metaphors in Readers’ Engagement with Characters: The Case of Ian 
McEwan’s Saturday.” Language and Literature 22, no. 1 (2013): 60–76. 
———. “Posthuman Narration as a Test Bed for Experientiality: The Case of Kurt Vonnegut’s 
Galápagos.” Partial Answers, 2018. 
———. “Tell-Tale Rhythms: Embodiment and Narrative Discourse.” Storyworlds 6, no. 2 (2014): 49–
73. 
Carroll, Joseph. “An Evolutionary Paradigm for Literary Study.” Style 42, no. 2 & 3 (2008): 103–35. 
                                                          
41 See also convergent arguments and close readings in Marco Caracciolo, “Bones in Outer Space: Narrative and 
the Cosmos in 2001: A Space Odyssey and Its Remediations,” Image & Narrative 16, no. 3 (2015): 73–89; 
“Posthuman Narration as a Test Bed for Experientiality: The Case of Kurt Vonnegut’s Galápagos,” Partial 
Answers, 2018. 
42 See David Herman, “Narratology beyond the Human,” DIEGESIS 3, no. 2 (2014), https://www.diegesis.uni-
wuppertal.de/index.php/diegesis/article/view/165; Alexa Weik von Mossner, Affective Ecologies: Empathy, 
Emotion, and Environmental Narrative (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2017). 
11 
 
Carroll, Joseph, Jonathan Gottschall, John A. Johnson, and Daniel Kruger. “Palaeolithic Politics in British 
Novels of the Nineteenth Century.” In Creating Consilience: Integrating the Sciences and the 
Humanities, edited by Edward Slingerland and Mark Collard, 385–408. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
Coetzee, J. M. The Lives of Animals. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
DePaolo, Charles. “Wells, Golding, and Auel: Representing the Neanderthal.” Science Fiction Studies 
27, no. 3 (2000): 418–38. 
Easterlin, Nancy. A Biocultural Approach to Literary Theory and Interpretation. Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. 
Esrock, Ellen J. “Embodying Art: The Spectator and the Inner Body.” Poetics Today 31, no. 2 (2010): 
217–50. 
Fauconnier, Gilles, and Mark Turner. The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden 
Complexities. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 
Fischer, Martin H., and Rolf A. Zwaan. “Embodied Language: A Review of the Role of the Motor System 
in Language Comprehension.” The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 61, no. 6 
(2008): 825–50. 
Fludernik, Monika. Towards a “Natural” Narratology. London: Routledge, 1996. 
Gallese, Vittorio. “Embodied Simulation: From Neurons to Phenomenal Experience.” Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2005): 23–48. 
Gallese, Vittorio, and George Lakoff. “The Brain’s Concepts: The Role of the Sensory-Motor System in 
Conceptual Knowledge.” Cognitive Neuropsychology, no. 22 (2005): 455–79. 
Geertz, Clifford. “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture.” In The Interpretation 
of Cultures: Selected Essays, 3–32. New York: Basic Books, 1973. 
Gibbs, Raymond W. “Walking the Walk While Thinking About the Talk: Embodied Interpretation of 
Metaphorical Narratives.” Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 42, no. 4 (2013): 363–78. 
Glenberg, Arthur M., and Michael P. Kaschak. “Grounding Language in Action.” Psychonomic Bulletin 
& Review 9, no. 3 (2002): 558–65. 
Golding, William. The Inheritors. London: Faber and Faber, 1955. 
Gottschall, Jonathan. The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human. New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2012. 
Gregor, Ian, and Mark Kinkead-Weekes. William Golding: A Critical Study of the Novels. London: Faber 
and Faber, 2002. 
Grusin, Richard. “Introduction.” In The Nonhuman Turn, edited by Richard Grusin, vii–xxix. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015. 
Herman, David. “Narratology beyond the Human.” DIEGESIS 3, no. 2 (2014). https://www.diegesis.uni-
wuppertal.de/index.php/diegesis/article/view/165. 
Kimmel, Michael. “Analyzing Image Schemas in Literature.” Cognitive Semiotics 5 (2009): 159–188. 
Marks, Lawrence E. “On Perceptual Metaphors.” Metaphor & Symbolic Activity 11, no. 1 (1996): 39–
66. 
Mason, Paul H., and Roger V. Short. “Neanderthal-Human Hybrids.” Hypothesis 9, no. 1 (2011): e1. 
McGurl, Mark. “The Posthuman Comedy.” Critical Inquiry 38, no. 3 (2012): 533–553. 
Mooallem, Jon. “Neanderthals Were People, Too.” The New York Times Magazine, January 11, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/magazine/neanderthals-were-people-too.html. 
Morton, Timothy. The Ecological Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. 
Pulvermüller, Friedemann. “Brain Mechanisms Linking Language and Action.” Nature Reviews. 
Neuroscience 6, no. 7 (2005): 576–82. 
Ritchie, L. David. “X IS A JOURNEY: Embodied Simulation in Metaphor Interpretation.” Metaphor and 
Symbol 23, no. 3 (2008): 174–99. 




Savarese, Emily Thornton, and Ralph James Savarese, eds. “Autism and the Concept of Neurodiversity: 
Special Issue.” Disability Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2010). 
Scarry, Elaine. Dreaming by the Book. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
Semino, Elena, and Gerard Steen. “Metaphor in Literature.” In The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor 
and Thought, edited by Raymond W. Gibbs, 232–46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008. 
Shryock, Andrew, and Daniel Lord Smail, eds. Deep History: The Architecture of Past and Present. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011. 
Weik von Mossner, Alexa. Affective Ecologies: Empathy, Emotion, and Environmental Narrative. 
Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2017. 
Wojciehowski, Hannah Chapelle, and Vittorio Gallese. “How Stories Make Us Feel: Toward an 
Embodied Narratology.” California Italian Studies 2, no. 1 (2011). 
Zwaan, Rolf A. “The Immersed Experiencer: Towards an Embodied Theory of Language 
Comprehension.” In The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, edited by Brian H. Ross, 35–
63. San Diego and London: Elsevier Academic Press, 2004. 
Zwaan, Rolf A., and Gabriel A. Radvansky. “Situation Models in Language Comprehension and 
Memory.” Psychological Bulletin 123, no. 2 (1998): 162–85. 
 
 
